FILED Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

NOV 16 2023

David W. Slayton, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court
By: N. Navarro, Deputy

# SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

EDWIN ENRIQUEZ, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated and similarly aggrieved employees,

Plaintiff,

٧.

THE JOHNNY ROCKETS GROUP, an active Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19STCV43986

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[RROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Date: November 16, 2023

Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: SSC-17

## I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Edwin Enriquez sues his former employer, The Johnny Rockets Group, for alleged wage and hour violations. Defendant is in the business of franchising Johnny Rockets restaurants as well as directly owning and operating Johnny Rockets-

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branded restaurants. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of Defendant's current and former non-exempt employees.

On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed the class action complaint against Defendant. On August 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint asserting the following causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay Wages (Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2); (2) Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512); (3) Failure to Provide Paid Rest Periods (Labor Code § 226.7); (4) Failure to Timely Pay Wages at Termination (Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203); (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements (Labor Code §§ 226(a), 226(b)); (6) Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.); and (7) Penalties Pursuant to Private Attorneys General Act (Labor Code § 2699, et seq.) ("PAGA").

On May 12, 2021, the parties participated in a full-day mediation before Jeffrey Krivis, which did not result in settlement. The parties resumed litigation while attempting to negotiate a settlement, and ultimately reached the proposed settlement before the Court. The terms of settlement were finalized in the long-form Stipulated Settlement Agreement, a copy of which was filed with the Court on October 5, 2022.

On February 22, 2023, the Court issued a "checklist" to the parties pertaining to deficiencies in the proposed settlement and called the matter of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement for hearing. Subsequently, the parties filed further briefing, including the Amended Stipulated Settlement Agreement attached to the Supplemental Declaration of Haik Hacopian filed April 28, 2023. All references below are to that agreement.

The settlement was preliminarily approved on July 7, 2023. Notice was given to the Class Members as ordered (see Declaration of Kaylie O'Connor ("O'Connor Decl.")). Now before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the

Settlement Agreement, including for payment of fees, costs, and a service award to the named plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants final approval of the settlement.

#### II. THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT

#### A. SETTLEMENT CLASS DEFINITION

"Settlement Class" and "Settlement Class Members" means shall refer to the following: All non-exempt employees who previously were employed by Defendant in California during the Class Period. (¶1.22)

"Class Period" means the period starting November 18, 2016 to March 1, 2022.  $(\P 1.5)$ 

"Aggrieved Employees" means all non-exempt employees who are or previously were employed by Defendant The Johnny Rockets Group, Inc. in California during the PAGA Period. (¶1.3)

"PAGA Period" means the period starting December 9, 2018 to March 1, 2022. (¶1.13)

"Participating Settlement Class Member" means a Settlement Class Member who has not timely opted-out of the Settlement. (¶1.14)

# B. THE MONETARY TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

The essential monetary terms are as follows:

• The Settlement Amount is \$600,000 (¶1.21). This includes payment of a PAGA penalty of \$20,000 to be paid 75% to the LWDA (\$15,000) and 25% to the Aggrieved Employees (\$5,000) (¶3.9).

- o It is estimated that the Settlement Class consists of approximately 530 individuals during the Class Period who worked approximately 37,662 workweeks during the Class Period. If the workweek number is greater than 110% of the workweek estimate provided for herein, Defendant may either: (1) increase the Settlement Amount on a pro rata basis for each workweek in excess of the 110% workweek estimate; or (2) adjust the end date of the Class Period so that the number of workweeks during the Class Period does not exceed 110% of the estimate. (¶1.21)
- At final approval, the settlement administrator represents that Class
   Members in aggregate worked a total of 26,430 workweeks during the
   Class Period. (O'Connor Decl. ¶15.) Accordingly, the escalator clause was not triggered.
- The Net Settlement Amount ("Net") (\$322,000) estimated at preliminary approval is the Settlement Amount less:
  - Up to \$210,000 (35%) for attorney fees (¶3.6);
  - o Up to \$25,000 for attorney costs (Ibid.);
  - Up to \$10,000 for a service award to the proposed class representative (¶3.8); and
  - Estimated \$13,000 for settlement administration costs (¶3.7).
- Employer-side payroll taxes will be paid by Defendant in addition to the Settlement Amount (¶1.21).
- Assuming the Court approves all maximum requested deductions, approximately \$330,201.41 will be available for automatic distribution to participating class members. The average settlement share will be approximately \$663.05.
   (\$330,201.41 Net ÷ 498 class members = \$663.05). In addition, each Aggrieved

Employee will receive a portion of the PAGA penalty, estimated to be \$23.81 per Aggrieved Employee. (\$5,000 or 25% of \$20,000 PAGA penalty ÷ 210 Aggrieved Employees = \$23.81).

- There is no Claim Requirement (¶4.2.d).
- The settlement is not reversionary (¶1.12).
- Amount to be included in the Class Notice sent to Settlement Class Members, the Settlement Administrator will: (¶4.3)
  - Determine the total number of Workweeks Worked by the Settlement Class during the Class Period as provided in the Class List and Data Report. (¶4.3.a)
  - O Divide the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks
    Worked by the Settlement Class to determine the Per Workweek
    Settlement Amount. The Per Workweek Settlement Amount shall then be
    multiplied by the number of Workweeks Worked by each Settlement
    Class Member during the applicable Class Period to determine each
    Settlement Class Member's Individual Settlement Amount. All
    Settlement Class Members will be entitled to payment for at least one (1)
    workweek. (¶4.3.b)
  - Any portion of the Net Settlement Amount not payable to Settlement
    Class Members shall be distributed to Participating Settlement Class
    Members on a basis proportional to the number of Workweeks Worked
    by each Participating Settlement Class Member, including Workweeks
    Worked enhancements. (¶4.9.a)

- Calculation of Individual PAGA Settlement Payment Amounts: The sum attributable to each Aggrieved Employee shall be allocated based on the proportionate number of weekly pay periods worked by the individual Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period relative to the total number of weekly pay periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period. (¶4.3.c)
- Tax Withholdings: Each Participating Settlement Class Member's Individual Settlement Payment shall be apportioned as 20% wages, 80% interest and penalties. (¶¶4.9.b, 4.9.c) 100% of each Aggrieved Employee's Individual PAGA Settlement Payment shall be apportioned to penalties. (¶4.9.d)
- Funding of Settlement: Within thirty (30) days after the Effective Date,
   Defendant shall deliver the Settlement Amount, or Six Hundred Thousand
   Dollars and No Cents (\$600,000.00), and the corresponding share of employer taxes to the Settlement Administrator. (¶4.12)
- Distribution: The Settlement Administrator shall make a distribution from the Qualified Settlement Fund not later than fourteen (14) days after receiving the Settlement Amount from Defendant. With the distribution, the Settlement Administrator is to make distributions to the appropriate parties for payments due under this Agreement as follows: (¶4.13)
  - Settlement Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs as awarded by the Court under Paragraph 3.6. (¶4.13.a)
  - The service award to Plaintiff Enriquez as awarded by the Court under Paragraph 3.8. (¶4.13.b)
  - o The PAGA payments to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees as set forth in Paragraph 3.9. (¶4.13.c)

- Payment to the Settlement Administrator for the costs of settlement administration as set forth in Paragraph 3.7 and approved by the Court. (¶4.13.d)
- o Individual Settlement Payments to Participating Class Members as set forth in Paragraph 4.3 and 4.9. (¶4.13.e)
- Uncashed Settlement Payment Checks: All checks for Individual Settlement
  Payments shall remain valid and negotiable for 180 days from the date of their
  issuance. Any checks not cashed during the 180 day period after distribution
  shall be void, and the Participating Settlement Class Member's release set forth
  herein shall remain valid. After the 180 day period following the final
  distribution, all funds will escheat to the State of California's Unclaimed
  Property Fund in the name of the Class Member. (¶4.15)

#### C. TERMS OF RELEASES

Release As To All Participating Class Members: Upon the Effective Date and funding in full of the Settlement Amount by Defendant, all Settlement Class Members who do not timely opt out of the Settlement ("Participating Class Members"), including their heirs, assigns, estates and representatives, shall be deemed to fully forever, irrevocably and unconditionally release and discharge the Released Parties from the Released Claims. The Settlement Agreement shall be in full settlement, compromise, release and discharge of the Released Claims and each of them, and the Released Claims by the Class Representative, and the Released Parties shall have no further or other liability or obligation to any Class Member and/or the Class Representative with respect to the Released Claims and

Class Representative's Released Claims, except as expressly provided herein. (¶5.1)

- o "Released Claims" means: all class claims alleged in the operative complaint which occurred during the Class Period, and expressly excluding all other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, and class claims outside of the Class Period. This release includes claims for failure to pay all wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to provide itemized wage statements, failure to pay all wages and termination and unfair business practices under the California Business and Professions Code associated with same. (¶1.17)
- Release As To All Aggrieved Employees: Upon the Effective Date and funding
  in full of the Settlement Amount by Defendant, Plaintiff and the State of
  California shall be deemed to fully forever, irrevocably and unconditionally
  release and discharge the Released Parties from the Released PAGA Claims.
  (¶5.1)
  - "Released PAGA Claims" means all PAGA claims alleged in the operative complaint and Plaintiff's PAGA notice to the LWDA which occurred during the PAGA Period, and expressly excluding all other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, and PAGA claims outside of the PAGA Period. This release includes PAGA claims for failure to pay all wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest

 periods, failure to provide itemized wage statements, failure to pay all wages and termination and unfair business practices under the California Business and Professions Code associated with same. (¶1.18)

- "Released Parties" means Defendant, and each of Defendant's respective past, present, and/or future, direct and/or indirect, officers, directors, members, managers, exempt employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, partners, investors, shareholders, administrators, parent companies, subsidiaries, related entities, affiliates, divisions, predecessors, successors, assigns, and joint venturers. (¶1.19)
- The named Plaintiff will also provide a general release and a waiver of the protections of Cal. Civ. Code §1542. (¶5.2)
- The releases are effective upon the Effective Date and funding in full of the Settlement Amount by Defendant, which will occur within thirty (30) days after the Effective Date. (¶4.12)

# III. ANALYSIS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

"Before final approval, the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement." Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g). "If the court approves the settlement agreement after the final approval hearing, the court must make and enter judgment. The judgment must include a provision for the retention of the court's jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the judgment. The court may not enter an order dismissing the action at the same time as, or after, entry of judgment." Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(h).

As discussed more fully in the Order conditionally approving the settlement, "[i]n a class action lawsuit, the court undertakes the responsibility to assess fairness in order to

prevent fraud, collusion or unfairness to the class, the settlement or dismissal of a class action. The purpose of the requirement [of court review] is the protection of those class members, including the named plaintiffs, whose rights may not have been given due regard by the negotiating parties." See Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2006) 141 Cal. App.4th 46, 60 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245 ("Wershba"), disapproved on another ground in Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260 [Court needs to "scrutinize the proposed settlement agreement to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned."] [internal quotation marks omitted].

"The burden is on the proponent of the settlement to show that it is fair and reasonable. However 'a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small." See *Wershba, supra, 91*Cal.App.4th at pg. 245, citing *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802. Notwithstanding an initial presumption of fairness, "the court should not give rubber-stamp approval." See *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130. "Rather, to protect the interests of absent class members, the court must independently and objectively analyze the evidence and circumstances before it in order to determine whether the settlement is in the best interests of those whose claims will be extinguished." *Ibid.*, citing 4 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11:41, p. 90. In that determination, the court should consider factors such as "the strength of plaintiffs'

case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." *Id.* at 128. This "list of factors is not exclusive and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of factors depending on the circumstances of each case." *Wershba*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pg. 245.)

#### A. A PRESUMPTION OF FAIRNESS EXISTS

The Court preliminarily found in its Order of July 7, 2023 that the presumption of fairness should be applied. No facts have come to the Court's attention that would alter that preliminary conclusion. Accordingly, the settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness as set forth in the preliminary approval order.

# B. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE

The settlement was preliminarily found to be fair, adequate and reasonable.

Notice has now been given to the Class and the LWDA. The notice process resulted in the following:

Number of class members: 498

Number of notices mailed: 498

Number of undeliverable notices: 10

Number of opt-outs: 0

Number of objections: 0

Number of participating class members: 498

(O'Connor Decl. ¶¶5-13.)

The Court finds that the notice was given as directed and conforms to due process requirements. Given the reactions of the Class Members and the LWDA to the proposed

settlement and for the reasons set for in the Preliminary Approval order, the settlement is found to be fair, adequate, and reasonable.

#### C. CLASS CERTIFICATION IS PROPER

For the reasons set forth in the preliminary approval order, certification of the Class for purposes of settlement is appropriate.

#### D. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Class Counsel requests \$210,000 (35%) for attorney fees and \$19,798.59 for costs. (MFA at 14:10-11, 18:27-19:1.)

Courts have an independent responsibility to review an attorney fee provision and award only what it determines is reasonable. (*Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.) A percentage calculation is permitted in common fund cases. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503.)

In the instant case, fees are sought pursuant to the percentage method, as cross-checked by lodestar. (MFA at pp. 13-18.) The \$210,000 fee request is 35% of the Settlement Amount, which is a higher percentage than the average fee award in class actions. (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 558, fn. 13 [noting that whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards average around one-third of the recovery, and that 25% is the benchmark].) The notice expressly advised class members of the fee request, and no one objected. (O'Connor Decl. ¶11, Exhibit A thereto.)

A lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonably hourly rate. (*PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096 (*PLCM*).) "Generally, '[t]he lodestar is calculated using the reasonable rate for comparable legal services in *the local community* for noncontingent litigation of the

same type, multiplied by the reasonable number of hours spent on the case.' "
(Environmental Protection Information Center v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248, quoting Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242-1243.)

As to the reasonableness of the rate and hours charged, trial courts consider factors such as "the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances." (*PLCM*, *supra*, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) "The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended." (*Christian Research Institute v. Alnor* (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.)

Attorney Hacopian represents that he incurred a lodestar of \$40,126.50, based on 89.17 hours of work at an hourly rate of \$450. (Declaration of Haik Hacopian ISO Final ¶16, Exhibit 2 thereto.) Attorney Mooradian represents that he incurred a lodestar of \$91,585, based on 140.9 hours of work at an hourly rate of \$650. (Declaration of Zorik Mooradian ISO Final ¶14, Exhibit 1 thereto.) Their firm's total lodestar of \$131,711.50 implies a multiplier of 1.59 to reach the requested fees of \$210,000. Neither attorney indicates whether their hourly rates have been approved by other courts.

In support of the 35% fee request, attorney Mooradian states: "In this matter, the Parties agreed that Class Counsel may request up to 35% and Defendant would not oppose the same." (Mooradian Decl. ISO Final ¶10; see also Settlement Agreement ¶3.6.) Mooradian then asserts that "[i]t is beyond any reasonable dispute that, if class counsel had been able to negotiate directly with the class members, the class would have found that a thirty-five percent fee arrangement was eminently reasonable." (Mooradian Decl. ISO Final ¶12.) He does not provide a factual basis for this assertion.

In addition, Mooradian contends: "While it's generally true that the greater the attorney fees, the less funds there will be for distribution to class members as damages, nevertheless, a balance must be achieved." (Mooradian Decl. ISO Final ¶15.) He continues by arguing that "[i]n light of the favorable settlement, giving more money to the class after an excellent settlement had been achieved punishes the attorneys without whom such a settlement would not have been attained but for the efforts of good lawyering. Punishing lawyers when they do well is potentially sending the wrong message and serves as a disincentive and unjustly enriches the class that has already received a fair and adequate amount of benefits." (*Ibid.*)

While the settlement in this case is fair there is nothing to suggest it is extraordinary. The parties reached a settlement in July 2022. No approvable settlement was tendered until May 2023. The settlement amount in total is modest compared to the maximum exposure but is appropriate given the facts.

Mooradian's argument implies that if this Court were to reduce the requested fee award below the parties' agreed-upon 35%, it would act as "punishing" counsel. Why any fee award granted by the court would be considered a form of "punishment" toward counsel is unclear. The court has a duty to assure that the amount and mode of payment of attorneys' fees are fair and proper, and may not simply act as a rubber stamp for the parties' agreement. (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 555.) Furthermore, Mooradian's assertion that a lower attorney fee award which results in more money being distributed to the class would "unjustly enrich" them creates the implication that he is prioritizing his interests over those of the class, a factor that courts have examined when assessing the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of settlements reaching final approval. See *Allen v. Bedolla* (9th Cir. 2015) 787 F.3d 1218, 1224.

No facts are presented suggesting a fee award at 35% is appropriate. There is nothing to suggest this case involved novel legal issues, or particularly difficult facts. Plaintiff's counsel is experienced in wage and hour cases (see Hacopian Decl. ISO Final ¶3, Mooradian Decl. ISO Final ¶4) and do not show they took any risk in excess of that normally taken in any other contingent fee case of this type.

A 33 1/3% award adequately rewards counsel for any risk they took in this case. Accordingly, the Court awards fees at 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, or \$200,000, a number still well in excess of the lodestar.

Class Counsel requests \$19,798.59 in costs. This is less than the \$25,000 cap provided in the settlement agreement (¶3.6). The amount was disclosed to Class Members in the Notice, and no objections were received. (O'Connor Decl. ¶11, Exhibit A thereto.) Costs include: Berger Consulting (\$8,600), Mediation (\$7,000), and Case Anywhere (\$1,863.60). (Hacopian Decl. ISO Final ¶16, Exhibit 2; Mooradian Decl. ISO Final ¶14, Exhibit 1.)

The costs appear to be reasonable and necessary to the litigation, are reasonable in amount, and were not objected to by the class.

For all of the foregoing reasons, costs of \$19,798.59 are approved.

# E. SERVICE AWARD TO CLASS REPRESENTATIVE

Service awards are established in California and the Ninth Circuit in class actions. See *Cellphone Termination Fee Case* (2010), 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-1394 (noting the "scholarly debate about the propriety of individual awards to named plaintiffs" and the "surprising dearth of California authority directly addressing this question"); *In re Apple Device Litigation* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2022) 50 F. 4<sup>th</sup> 769, 785; Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC (9th Cir. 2019) 944 F.3d 1035, 1057 (reasonable incentive

awards are permitted to compensate class representatives for work on behalf of the class and financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action).

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Their apparent purpose is to reimburse actual expenses or to compensate a plaintiff where the market would not otherwise produce a plaintiff. In Re Continental Securities Litigation (7th Cir. 1992) 962 F. 2d 566, 571-572. Under existing California and Ninth Circuit authority they are permitted where there is a showing of the time and effort expended by the individual and a reasoned explanation of financial or other risks undertaken by the class representative. See Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 806-807; see also Cellphone Termination Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394-1395 ["Criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation and; (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. (Citations.)"]. Although no amount is set, in the Ninth Circuit many courts have found \$5,000 presumptively reasonable. See Morrison v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross (N.D.Cal. Jan. 8, 2021, No. 19-cv-02855-HSG) 2021 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 4043, at \*24 (citing cases).

In determining the reasonableness of a requested incentive award, some courts have considered, among other factors, the proportionality between the incentive award requested and the average class member's recovery. *Id.* See also *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412-413. (Service award that was approximately twice what was paid to class members was appropriate exercise of Court's discretion). In addition, a service award is not additional consideration for a

release of additional claims. See *Grady v. RCM Techs., Inc.* (C.D.Cal. May 2, 2023, No. 5:22-cv-00842 JLS-SHK) 2023 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 84145, at \*24-32 and cases cited therein.

The Class Representative Edwin Enriquez requests an enhancement award of \$10,000. (MFA at 19:13-14.) Plaintiff represents that his contributions to this action include: assisting his attorneys, participating in telephonic conferences with his attorneys, looking for documents, answering calls from other employees about the lawsuit, and reviewing the settlement agreement and his declaration. (Declaration of Edwin Enriquez ¶6.) He estimates spending approximately 23 hours on the case. (*Id.* at ¶7.) His request is more than ten times that of the average class member award of \$663.05.

In light of the above-described contributions to this action, and in acknowledgment of the benefits obtained on behalf of the class, a \$5,000 service award to Plaintiff is reasonable and approved.

#### F. SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS

The Settlement Administrator, CPT Group, Inc., requests \$10,000 in compensation for its work in administrating this case. (O'Connor Decl. ¶17.) At the time of preliminary approval, costs of settlement administration were capped in the settlement agreement at \$13,000 (¶3.7). Class Members were instead provided with notice of the estimate of \$10,000 and did not object. (O'Connor Decl. ¶11, Exhibit A thereto.)

Accordingly, settlement administration costs are approved in the amount of \$10,000.

### IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court hereby:

1	(1)	Grants class certification for purposes of settlement;
2	(2)	Grants final approval of the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable;
3	(3)	Awards \$200,000 in attorney fees to Class Counsel, Mooradian Law, APC;
4	(4)	Awards \$19,798.59 in litigation costs to Class Counsel;
5	(5)	Approves payment of \$15,000 (75% of \$20,000 PAGA penalty) to the LWDA;
6	(6)	Awards \$5,000 as a Class Representative Service Award to Edwin Enriquez;
7	(7)	Awards \$10,000 in settlement administration costs to CPT Group, Inc.;
8	(8)	Orders class counsel to lodge a proposed Judgment, consistent with this ruling
9		and containing the class definition, full release language, and a statement that no
10		class members opted out by;
11	(9)	Orders class counsel to provide notice to the class members pursuant to
12		California Rules of Court, rule 3.771(b) and to the LWDA pursuant to Labor
13		Code §2699 (1)(3); and
14	(10)	Sets a Non-Appearance Case Review re: Final Report re: Distribution of
15		Settlement Funds for
16		11/8/24 , at 8:30 pam
17		Final Report is to be filed by
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21	D	Dated: 11/16/2023 Moren E. Rolv
22		MAREN E. NELSON
23		Judge of the Superior Court